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I.   INTRODUCTION
A profound statement by United States Supreme Court Justice
Tom Clark sums up the problem of drinking and driving in the
United States: “[T]he increasing slaughter on our highways, most of
which should be avoidable, now reaches the astounding figures only
heard of on the battlefield.”1 Ironically, the Vietnam War, which di-
vided the nation and raised its consciousness with respect to the
tragic loss of young lives, had a casualty level far short of the death
and mayhem attributable to drinking and driving.2 Some 47,369
Americans, mostly teenagers, lost their lives in the jungles of Viet-
nam.3 During that same time, because of drinking and driving,
                                                                                                                   
* The author thanks his wife, Sonya, for her unselfish support during the last three
years.
1. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957).
2. Oversight into the Administration of State and Local Court Adjudication of Driv-
ing While Intoxicated: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong. 93 (1982) (statement of Dr. Alastair Conn, Medical Director, Field
Operations Program, Maryland Inst. for Emergency Med. Sys.) [hereinafter Conn State-
ment].
3. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1997, at 184 (1996); see also Ken-
neth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38
UCLA L. REV. 499, 582 n.133 (1991) (stating that the average age of servicemen killed in
Vietnam was 19).
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274,000 Americans lost their lives4 in the far more deadly concrete
jungle of our nation’s streets and highways.
Attempts to curb the slaughter on our nation’s highways have
greatly increased since legislation enacted in the early 1900s made it
illegal to operate a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.5 In
the early 1980s, organizations like Mothers Against Drunk Driving
(MADD), Students Against Drunk Driving (SADD), and Remove In-
toxicated Drivers (RID) helped raise awareness of the problem and
successfully lobbied Congress for tougher drinking-and-driving leg-
islation.6 From laws on blood- or breath-alcohol content7 to sobriety
checkpoints,8 the fight to stop drinking and driving has met with
overwhelming approval from the courts.
On January 1, 1997, Florida’s new administrative driver’s license
suspension law, section 322.2616, Florida Statutes, became effective,
bringing tough new penalties for individuals under the age of
twenty-one who drink and drive.9 The new law requires the suspen-
sion of driving privileges for those under twenty-one who have either
a blood- or breath-alcohol level of 0.02% or higher or who refuse to
submit to a blood- or breath-alcohol exam.10
No one would deny that laws aimed at reducing the number of fa-
talities attributable to drinking and driving on Florida’s and our na-
tion’s highways are appropriate. However, such laws must be closely
scrutinized to ensure that in the process of reducing fatalities, cher-
ished constitutional protections remain intact. This Comment ana-
lyzes Florida’s new administrative driver’s license suspension law
for its constitutional and public policy soundness. Part II provides a
brief history of recent laws designed to prevent drinking and driving,
particularly those laws aimed at individuals under the age of
twenty-one. Part III provides an overview of the new law. Part IV
provides due process, double jeopardy, and public policy analyses of
the new law. Finally, Part V concludes that the Florida Legislature
should amend the new law to correct due process problems associ-
ated with the use of alcohol screening devices and double jeopardy
problems associated with parallel criminal prosecutions.
                                                                                                                   
4. See Conn Statement, supra note 2, at 93.
5. See William J. Ostrowski, Drunk Driving and Chemical Tests—A Labyrinthine
Maze, 63 N.Y. ST. B.J. 22, 22 (1991).
6. See Mark Feigl, Note, DWI and the Insanity Defense: A Reasoned Approach, 20
VT. L. REV. 161, 166 (1995).
7. See State v. Rolle, 560 So. 2d 1154, 1156 (Fla. 1990) (finding that evidence of a
blood- or breath-alcohol level of 0.10% is prima facie evidence the defendant was under
the influence to the extent his normal faculties were impaired).
8. See Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (finding sobri-
ety checkpoint law constitutional).
9. See FLA. STAT. § 322.2616 (Supp. 1996); see also Act effective Jan. 1, 1997, ch. 96-
272, § 3, 1996 Fla. Laws 1091, 1100.
10. See FLA. STAT. § 322.2616(2)(a) (Supp. 1996).
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II.   A BRIEF HISTORY OF STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS ENACTED TO
PREVENT DRINKING AND DRIVING
Just as they suffered the most in the Vietnam War, the youth of
our nation have suffered the most from the lethal effects of drinking
and driving. Various studies have shown that young drivers are
killed in alcohol-related accidents at a higher rate than other driv-
ers.11 One study showed that persons under twenty were killed at a
rate of 4.5 for every one million vehicle miles.12 The same study
showed a fatality rate of 3.38 for twenty-year-olds, 4.08 for twenty-
one-year-olds, 3.10 for twenty-two- to twenty-four-year-olds, and 1.50
for twenty-five- to forty-four-year-olds.13
A.   The National Minimum Drinking Age
In 1982, in response to the national drinking-and-driving prob-
lem, President Reagan established the Presidential Commission on
Drunken Driving.14 The Commission, attempting to protect young
drivers, recommended that states raise the legal drinking age to
twenty-one.15 Many states, including Florida, did not follow the
Commission’s recommendation, and eventually Congress enacted a
law establishing a national minimum drinking age.16 Congress suc-
cessfully pressured states, including Florida, to adopt the national
minimum drinking age by conditioning receipt of federal highway
funds on adoption of the minimum drinking age.17 Nevertheless, not
all states complied quietly with this strong-arm approach. South
Dakota unsuccessfully challenged the legislation as a violation of the
Twenty-First Amendment and an unconstitutional exercise of con-
gressional spending power.18 The Supreme Court, finding this
method of federal spending constitutional, paved the way for future
drinking-and-driving legislation at the federal level.
                                                                                                                   
11. See, e.g., Mark L. Weber, Note, Reyes v. Kuboyama: Vendor Liability for the Sale
of Intoxicating Liquor to Minors Under a Common Law Negligence Theory, 17 U. HAW. L.
REV. 355, 355 (1995) (citing statistics showing that the alcohol-related fatal accident
rate for 18- to 20-year-olds was twice as high per capita as the rate for those over age
21).
12. See Michael Philip Rosenthal, The Minimum Drinking Age for Young People: An
Observation, 92 DICK. L. REV. 649, 658 (1988) (citing statistics from a 1984 study con-
ducted by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration).
13. See id.
14. See Exec. Order No. 12,358, 47 Fed. Reg. 16,311 (1982).
15. See Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 658.
16. See Act of July 17, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-363, §§ 6-7, 98 Stat. 435, 437-39 (codified
as amended at 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1994)).
17. See id.
18. See South Dakota v. Dole, 423 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).
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B.   Zero-Tolerance Legislation
Recently, Congress passed the National Highway System Desig-
nation Act of 1995,19 which requires states to enact and enforce zero-
tolerance laws aimed at individuals under the age of twenty-one who
have a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.02% or greater while operat-
ing a motor vehicle.20 Like the National Minimum Drinking Age Act,
this federal law requires states to pass zero-tolerance legislation as a
condition for receiving federal transportation funds.21 A state’s fail-
ure to pass such legislation will result in a loss of five percent of fed-
eral highway funds on October 1, 1998,22 and a ten-percent loss every
year thereafter.23 To date, some thirty-four states, including Flor-
ida,24 have passed such legislation.25
Whether they have resulted in tough legislation, increased con-
sciousness, or both, the efforts of groups like MADD have successfully
reduced the number of deaths from drunk driving.26 Nonetheless,
drunk driving is still a problem. According to MADD, in Florida, in-
toxicated drivers under age twenty-one were responsible for eighty-
four fatalities, 1231 injuries, and 1617 vehicle accidents in 1993.27
III.   SECTION 322.2616, FLORIDA STATUTES
In light of economic pressure from Congress and lobbying by anti-
drinking-and-driving organizations, the Florida Legislature unani-
mously passed Committee Substitute for House Bill 455 during the
1996 Regular Session.28 Governor Lawton Chiles signed the bill into
law on May 29, 1996.29 In general, the statute provides for the ad-
ministrative suspension of driver’s licenses for individuals under age
twenty-one who drive with a blood- or breath-alcohol level of 0.02%
or higher or who refuse to submit to a breath-alcohol exam.30
                                                                                                                   
19. Pub. L. No. 104-59, 109 Stat. 568 (codified in scattered sections of 23 U.S.C.A.
(West Supp. 1996)).
20. See id. § 320, 109 Stat at 589 (codified at 23 U.S.C.A. § 161(a)(3) (West Supp. 1996)).
21. See 23 U.S.C.A. § 161(a) (West Supp. 1996).
22. See id. § 161(a)(1).
23. See id. § 161(a)(2).
24. See Act effective Jan. 1, 1997, ch. 96-272, § 1, 1996 Fla. Laws 1091, 1091-96 (codi-
fied at FLA. STAT. § 322.2616 (Supp. 1996)).
25. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Crim. Just., CS for HB 455 (1996) Staff Analysis 6 (final
July 1, 1996) (on file with comm.) [hereinafter Staff Analysis].
26. See Eustace T. Francis, Combating the Drunk Driver Menace: Conditioning the
Use of Public Highways on Consent to Sobriety Checkpoint Seizures—The Constitutional-
ity of a Model Consent Seizure Statute, 59 ALB. L. REV. 599, 610 (1995).
27. See Staff Analysis, supra note 25, at 2. 
28. See Act effective Jan. 1, 1997, ch. 96-272, 1996 Fla. Laws 1091; see also Staff
Analysis, supra note 25, at 6.
29. See ch. 96-272, § 3, 1996 Fla. Laws at 1100.
30. See FLA. STAT. § 322.2616(2)(a) (Supp. 1996).
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More specifically, the statute makes it unlawful for persons under
age twenty-one to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle when they have a blood- or breath-alcohol level of 0.02% or
higher.31 The statute provides that when a law enforcement officer
has probable cause to believe that a person under twenty-one oper-
ating a vehicle has any alcohol on his or her breath, the officer may
detain that person and request that he or she submit to a breath-
alcohol test.32 This test can be conducted by a breath-measurement
device as provided in section 316.1932, Florida Statutes, or by an
approved preliminary alcohol screening (PAS) device.33 If it is deter-
mined the individual has a breath-alcohol level of 0.02% or higher,
the law enforcement officer must suspend that individual’s license
on behalf of the Florida Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) for a
period of six months for the first offense and one year for subsequent
violations.34 If an individual refuses to submit to an exam, the officer
must suspend that individual’s license for a period of one year for a
first refusal or for eighteen months if the person has a previous sus-
pension under the statute.35 Although any suspension is automatic,
the officer is required to issue a ten-day temporary driving permit.36
During this ten-day period, a suspended driver may request an in-
formal or formal review of the suspension.37
The informal procedure provides only for a review of the materi-
als submitted by the law enforcement officer and by the person
whose license was suspended.38 A hearing officer from DMV conducts
the hearing.39 The hearing officer can sustain, amend, or invalidate
the suspension based on examination of the materials,40 including
results from PAS devices, which are presumed accurate for both for-
mal and informal reviews.41
If a formal review is requested, DMV conducts a hearing with any
subpoenaed witnesses and any relevant evidence.42 The hearing offi-
cer determines by a preponderance of the evidence whether suffi-
cient cause exists to sustain, amend, or invalidate the suspension.43
However, the review is limited to issues of probable cause, age, and
                                                                                                                   
31. See id.
32. See id. § 322.2616(1)(b).
33. See id. § 322.2616(17); see also id. § 316.1932.




38. See id. § 322.2616(5).
39. See id. § 322.2616(5), (7)(b).
40. See id. § 322.2616(6).
41. See id. § 322.2616(17).
42. See id. § 322.2616(7)(b).
43. See id. § 322.2616(8).
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whether the breath-alcohol level was 0.02% or higher.44 If the review
is based on a refusal to submit to a breath-alcohol exam, the hearing
is limited to issues of probable cause, age, and notice of implied con-
sent to submit to a breath-alcohol exam.45 A person may appeal the
hearing officer’s decision by writ of certiorari to the circuit court in the
county where the person resides or where the hearing took place.46
Further, the statute provides that by applying for and using a
driver’s license, a person under twenty-one is deemed to have con-
sented to the provisions of the statute.47 In addition, the statute pro-
vides that a violation is neither a criminal offense nor a traffic viola-
tion, and that any detention under the statute does not constitute an
arrest.48 Lastly, the statute prohibits the dual suspension of a
driver’s license through both its own procedures and those of section
316.2615, Florida Statutes.49 Nevertheless, a suspension under this
section does not bar prosecution under section 316.193, Florida
Statutes, for criminal drinking and driving.50
IV.   ANALYSIS
A.   Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment51 limits a
state’s ability to restrict or interfere with an individual’s rights and
                                                                                                                   
44. See id. § 322.2616(8)(a).
45. See id. § 322.2616(8)(b).
46. See id. § 322.2616(14).
47. See id. § 322.2616(16).
48. See id. § 322.2616(18).
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Although the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states
from denying an individual the equal protection of the laws, see id., and thus mandates
that states treat similarly situated persons similarly and not classify them based on im-
permissible criteria, see JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
14.2, at 587 (5th ed. 1995), the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld age-based clas-
sifications when they possess a rational basis, see, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
470-73 (1991); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976). Moreover, the Court also has specifically upheld
laws regulating the rights and liberties of persons under the age of 18 as possessing a ra-
tional basis as long as the classification did not impinge upon a fundamental right. See,
e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302-03 (1993) (finding that minors do not have funda-
mental right to be in noncustodial setting). Driving is not considered a fundamental right.
See, e.g., Lite v. State, 617 So. 2d 1058, 1060 n.2 (Fla. 1993).
Nevertheless, although age classifications are not prohibited by the U.S. Constitution,
states may protect age groups through their own constitutions or legislation. See, e.g., LA.
CONST. art. I, § 3; FLA. STAT. § 743.07 (1995). The Louisiana Constitution specifies age as
a protected category in its equal protection clause. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 3. However, the
Louisiana Supreme Court has upheld drinking restrictions based on age using a height-
ened intermediate level of scrutiny. See Manuel v. State, 677 So. 2d 116, 125 (La. 1996). In
1973, the Florida Legislature passed a law stating that individuals over the age of 18
“shall enjoy and suffer the rights, privileges, and obligations of all persons 21 years of age
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ensures procedural safeguards before a person can be deprived of
certain rights. The protections apply to both civil and criminal pro-
ceedings.52 Similarly, Florida’s due process clause provides that “[n]o
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due proc-
ess of law, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, or be
compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against himself.”53
Specifically, due process wears two hats. One is substantive due
process, which protects life, liberty, or property interests from un-
warranted governmental interference.54 The second is procedural
due process, which requires states to provide protections, such as no-
tice and an opportunity to be heard, before depriving an individual of
life, liberty, or property.55
There are two levels of review when determining whether a law
violates substantive due process.56 Laws restricting fundamental
rights are subject to review under the strict scrutiny standard.57
Laws restricting nonfundamental rights are subject to review under
the highly deferential rational relationship standard.58 Under the
administrative driver’s license suspension statute, the only substan-
tive right at issue is the right to drive, which is not a fundamental
right.59 Accordingly, courts would review the statute under the ra-
tional relationship standard, which would only require the courts to
find that the suspension of driving privileges is rationally related to
                                                                                                                   
or older.” Act effective July 1, 1973, ch. 73-21, §§ 2-3, 1973 Fla. Laws 59, 59 (codified as
amended at FLA. STAT. § 743.07 (1995)). The only exceptions to the law are those rights
that are excluded under the Florida Constitution and the state Beverage Law. See FLA.
STAT. § 743.07 (1995). Although the administrative driver’s license suspension statute
would seem to be in conflict with this law, the Florida Supreme Court would likely uphold
the statute using basic principles of statutory construction:
[A] specific statute covering a particular subject area always controls over a
statute covering the same and other subjects in more general terms. The more
specific statute is considered to be an exception to the general terms of the
more comprehensive statute. . . .
Further, when two statutes are in conflict, the later promulgated statute
should prevail as the last expression of legislative intent.
McKendry v. State, 641 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1994) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, to en-
sure that such a conflict does not arise, the Legislature should amend section 743.07, Flor-
ida Statutes, to include a specific exception for the new statute, just as it did after passing
the state Beverage Law. See Act Effective Oct. 1, 1980, ch. 80-74, § 5, 1980 Fla. Laws 254,
256 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 743.07(1) (1995)).
52. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 51, § 13.1, at 511.
53. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).
55. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
56. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (finding restrictions on the fun-
damental right to marry should be subject to strict scrutiny); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,
303 (1993) (finding the right not to be placed in a custodial institution nonfundamental
and thus subject to rational relationship scrutiny).
57. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386.
58. See Reno, 507 U.S. at 301-03.
59. See Lite v. State, 617 So. 2d 1058, 1060 n.2 (1993).
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the objective of highway safety.60 Courts have determined that such
a relationship exists and, therefore, that suspension of driving
privileges does not violate substantive due process.61
Procedural due process is more commonly thought of when due
process issues arise. In Mathews v. Eldridge,62 the U.S. Supreme
Court formulated a balancing test for determining whether proce-
dural due process has been violated.63 Under the Mathews test,
courts are to balance the importance of the individual interest at
stake and the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest against
the importance of the governmental interest, including any fiscal
and administrative burdens that additional procedures would en-
tail.64
1.   The Individual Interest at Stake
The first inquiry in determining whether the driver’s license sus-
pension statute violates procedural due process is whether a protect-
able individual interest is at stake.65 “Procedural due process im-
poses constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individu-
als of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”66 The U.S.
Supreme Court has generally taken a liberal view of what consti-
tutes a liberty or property interest:
[Liberty] denotes, not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according
to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the or-
derly pursuit of happiness by free men.67
Furthermore, in the early 1970s, the Court expanded the definition
of what constitutes property for procedural due process protection to
include benefits such as welfare,68 even though such benefits were
once viewed as a privilege created by the state.69
 In Bell v. Burson,70 the Supreme Court determined that a driver’s
license was a protectable interest when it found that suspending
                                                                                                                   
60. See id. at 1060.
61. See id. at 1061.
62. 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
63. See id. at 335.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 332.
66. Id.
67. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
68. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-64 (1970).
69. See id.
70. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
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driver’s licenses “adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In
such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that proce-
dural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”71 Thus,
the continued possession of a driver’s license is a protectable inter-
est, and a state must afford an individual procedural due process
when it revokes or suspends the individual’s driver’s license.72
After finding a protectable interest, the next step is to determine
the importance of that interest. The right to drive is considered an
important interest, but it is not a fundamental right.73 Accordingly,
only minimal process is required before a state suspends or revokes
a driver’s license. The Bell Court found that only a hearing is neces-
sary before a state deprives an individual of a driver’s license.74 After
Bell was decided, the Court, in Dixon v. Love,75 determined that al-
though a hearing is required, it does not need to be held before the
suspension.76 Furthermore, the type of hearing required is not a full
judicial hearing, but rather an administrative hearing.77 The ad-
ministrative driver’s license suspension statute meets these re-
quirements by providing for an administrative hearing.78 The provi-
sions of the new law allowing for the suspension of a driver’s license
before such a hearing79 also meet due process requirements in light
of the Court’s determination in Dixon.80
2.   The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation and the Governmental
Interest at Stake
After finding a protectable interest and determining its impor-
tance, courts assess the “risk of an erroneous deprivation of such in-
terest through the procedures used.”81 Evaluating the risk of errone-
ous deprivation entails considering “the fairness and reliability of
the existing . . . procedures, and the probable value, if any, of addi-
tional procedural safeguards.”82
                                                                                                                   
71. Id. at 539.
72. See id.
73. See Lite v. State, 617 So. 2d 1058, 1060 n.2 (Fla. 1993) (“[D]riving is not a funda-
mental right.”); see also Bell, 402 U.S. at 539 (“Suspension of issued licenses . . . adjudi-
cates important interests of the licensees.”).
74. See 402 U.S. at 542.
75. 431 U.S. 105 (1977).
76. See id. at 115
77. See id.
78. See FLA. STAT. § 322.2616(2)(b)(3) (Supp. 1996) (“The driver may request a formal
or informal review of the suspension . . . .”).
79. See id. § 322.2616(2)(a) (allowing a law enforcement officer on the scene to sus-
pend the license on behalf of DMV).
80. See 431 U.S. at 106.
81. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
82. Id. at 343.
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Under the driver’s license suspension statute, the three proce-
dures that could lead to erroneous deprivation are:83 (1) the law en-
forcement officer’s observations giving rise to probable cause that an
individual was under the influence of alcoholic beverages or had any
level of breath alcohol;84 (2) the measurement of breath alcohol with
scientific devices;85 and (3) the screening for sobriety through the use
of PAS devices.86
Under the statute, an underage person can have his or her license
suspended for a blood- or breath-alcohol level of 0.02% or higher.87
This is a very low amount of alcohol in light of the fact that a 150-
pound person’s blood- or breath-alcohol level would be 0.025% after
consuming one ounce of hard liquor.88 Thus, one alcoholic drink pro-
vides twenty percent more blood or breath alcohol than is required to
violate the statute. The small alcohol level required to violate the
statute thus increases the chance of erroneous deprivation.89
a.   Human Error
A law enforcement officer must have probable cause that a driver
under the age of twenty-one is intoxicated or has any level of breath-
alcohol before requesting an individual to submit to a blood- or
breath-alcohol test.90 To sustain a suspension for an individual’s re-
fusal to submit to a blood or breath exam, a hearing officer must de-
termine: (1) whether the law enforcement officer at the scene had
probable cause; (2) whether the driver was under age twenty-one; (3)
whether the driver refused to submit to an exam after a request; and
(4) whether the driver was informed that a refusal to submit to an
exam would result in a suspension of his or her license.91
At the low blood-alcohol level of 0.02%, physical signs of impair-
ment such as slurred speech or bloodshot eyes are not likely to be
                                                                                                                   
83. Although officer fabrication could also lead to erroneous deprivation, this Com-
ment does not address that issue. See Samborn v. State, 666 So. 2d 937, 938 (Fla. 5th DCA
1995) (finding that civilian breath-testing technicians routinely destroyed test-result
“print-cards” showing that the testing device may have been out of tolerance and operat-
ing in error).
84. See FLA. STAT. § 322.2616(1)(b) (Supp. 1996).
85. See id.
86. See id. § 322.2616(17).
87. See id. § 322.2616(2)(a).
88. See Myles A. Kauffman, The Coming of Subsection (a)(5) of Pennsylvania’s Drunk
Driving Law: “A Statute with a Face Only a Prosecutor Could Love,” 4 WIDENER J. PUB. L.
493, 505 (1995).
89. See Robert J. DeLucia, Drug and Alcohol Testing Issues in the Airline and
Railroad Industries, SA31 A.L.I.- A.B.A. 765, 779 (1996) (stating questions of calibra-
tion of the equipment and skill of the collector are likely to arise at the low threshold of
0.02%).
90. See FLA. STAT. § 322.2616(1)(b) (Supp. 1996).
91. See id. § 322.2616(8)(b).
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present.92 Absent physical signs of impairment, the law enforcement
officer must rely on the odor of alcohol on the breath of the driver or
the presence of open containers in the vehicle for probable cause.
The low blood-alcohol level of 0.02% is difficult to detect by relying
on the odor of alcohol on the breath of the driver because such a low
blood-alcohol level results in a correspondingly low breath-alcohol
level.93 Also, there is the strong possibility that at these low levels,
the odor of alcohol from an open container or a passenger might be
mistaken for alcohol on the breath of the driver.
These possibilities of erroneous deprivation through mistaken
probable cause must be balanced against the state’s interest in
highway safety. Courts have found highway safety to be a very im-
portant interest that can outweigh the erroneous deprivation of
driving privileges.94 Nevertheless, the question arises whether there
are any serious concerns about highway safety when drivers have a
blood- or breath-alcohol level of 0.02%. In Florida, there is a pre-
sumption of sobriety at a blood- or breath-alcohol level of less than
0.05%.95 This fact arguably destroys any contention of serious safety
problems at low alcohol levels. Accordingly, in balancing the individ-
ual’s interest in erroneous deprivations by law enforcement officers
against the state’s interests, it is possible that courts could find a
violation of procedural due process.
b.   Machine Error
Common sense leads one to believe that a driver not engaged in
illegal activities will be more likely to submit to a breath exam than
one who is. Accordingly, the reliability of breath measurement de-
vices is paramount in avoiding erroneous deprivation of the driving
privileges of those who submit to breath-alcohol tests.
Errors due to the calibration of a breath-alcohol testing device or
the skill of the officer in operating the device are likely to arise at
low breath-alcohol levels such as 0.02%.96 Furthermore, breath-
                                                                                                                   
92. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 648 So. 2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1995) (signs of bloodshot eyes,
slurred speech, and a strong odor of alcohol used as probable cause that defendant was in-
toxicated). Obviously, none of these signs are present with a 0.00% blood-alcohol level.
Some experts maintain that outward signs of intoxication such as slurred speech cannot
be detected until an individual’s blood-alcohol level reaches 0.15%. See Greg K. Vitali,
Note, An In-Depth Analysis of the Development and Ramifications of New Jersey’s Social
Host Liability Statute, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 532, 562 n.82 (1996). Accordingly, the
ability to detect outward manifestations of intoxication increases as blood-alcohol levels
increase. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., Andrew J. Schatkin, Criminal Procedure, 1994-95 Survey of New York
Law, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 405, 411 (1995) (stating that blood-alcohol level is directly re-
lated to breath-alcohol level).
94. See Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 114 (1977).
95. See FLA. STAT. § 316.1934(2)(a) (1995).
96. See DeLucia, supra note 89, at 779.
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alcohol testing devices do not differentiate between alcohol from al-
coholic beverages, cold medicines, or mouthwash.97 There are some
popular cold medicines that are ten percent alcohol by volume and
some mouthwashes that are over twenty percent alcohol by volume.98
Scenarios in which someone’s teenage son or daughter wrongfully
loses his or her driver’s license because of cold medicine or mouth-
wash are far from fiction.99 Lastly, all breath-alcohol testing devices
have some degree of tolerance. The Intoxilyzer 5000, which is used in
Florida, has a tolerance of 0.005%.100 Although this is a small
amount, it is one-quarter of the 0.02% breath-alcohol level required
for suspension of driving privileges under the new statute.101
As previously discussed, with sobriety presumed at a blood- or
breath-alcohol level of 0.05%,102 it would seem difficult for the state’s
interest in highway safety to carry much weight in light of these pos-
sible sources of erroneous deprivation. However, while developing a
more accurate and discriminatory breath-alcohol testing device
would reduce the chances of erroneous deprivation, such a device
would, in all likelihood, be extremely expensive. Thus, the state’s fis-
cal interest would likely outweigh the individual’s interest in pre-
venting erroneous deprivation.103
c.   Preliminary Alcohol Screening Devices
Of greatest concern is the use and presumed accuracy of PAS de-
vices.104 Specifically, the statute provides:
A breath test to determine breath-alcohol level pursuant to this
section may be conducted as authorized by s. 316.1932 or by a pre-
liminary alcohol screening test device listed in the United States
Department of Transportation’s conforming-product list of eviden-
tial breath-measurement devices. The reading from such a device
                                                                                                                   
97. See People v. Bergman, 623 N.E.2d 1052, 1054 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993) (reporting that
Listerine mouthwash and Binaca breath spray give a reading of alcohol on the breatha-
lyzer); see also FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11D-8.007(2) (1996) (requiring 20-minute obser-
vation before administering a breath test to ensure that the subject does not regurgitate
or take anything by mouth).
98. The label for NyQuil cold medicine reports that the alcohol content is 10% by vol-
ume. The label for Listerine mouth wash reports that the alcohol content is 21.6% by vol-
ume.
99. See Bergman, 623 N.E.2d at 1054.
100. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11D-8.003(7)(a)(2) (1996).
101. See FLA. STAT. § 322.2616(2)(a) (Supp. 1996).
102. See supra text accompanying note 87.
103. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (“At some point the benefit of
an additional safe-guard to the individual affected . . . to society in terms of increased as-
surance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost.”).
104. See Coniglio v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 123, 133-34 (Ct.
App. 1995) (finding that due process requires a foundational showing of the reliability of
breath measurement devices and that such reliability cannot be presumed).
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is presumed accurate and is admissible in evidence in any adminis-
trative hearing conducted under this section.105
This addition is suspect for three reasons. First, the use of such de-
vices is not enumerated in section 322.2615, Florida Statutes, the
driver’s license suspension statute applicable to individuals of all
ages.106 Because suspensions under both statutes are based on blood-
or breath-alcohol levels, it seems difficult to justify the use and pre-
sumed accuracy of PAS devices against those under age twenty-one
but not against those over twenty-one.107 Furthermore, because the
individual’s interest in additional procedural protections, which in
this instance would prohibit the use of PAS devices, must be bal-
anced against the state’s interest in increased highway safety, PAS
devices should be used only in suspensions under section 322.2615,
Florida Statutes, which require a 0.08% blood- or breath-alcohol
level108 and are thus more closely related to highway safety.109
Second, the issue of residual mouth alcohol causing inaccurate
measurements is more prevalent in PAS devices.110 If mouth alcohol
is present, an inordinately high reading will result because breath
measurement devices cannot differentiate between alcohol in the
breath from respiration and alcohol present in the mouth from re-
cent alcohol intake.111 In Florida, before administering a breath exam
using the Intoxilyzer 5000, the law enforcement officer or technician
administering the test must observe the subject for twenty min-
utes.112 This observation is required to ensure the subject does not
drink any alcohol or regurgitate, which causes alcohol from the
stomach to become present in the mouth.113 No similar observation
period is required before administering a breath exam using a PAS
device because they are normally used as screening tools to deter-
mine if an additional breath exam needs to be given. However, under
                                                                                                                   
105. See FLA. STAT. § 322.2616(17) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
106. See FLA. STAT. § 322.2615 (1995).
107. But see Coniglio, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 128. Under the initial version of California’s
zero-tolerance law, a breath test was required at a testing facility. See id. However, oppo-
nents representing law enforcement associations said such procedures would take too
much time to accomplish and would be too costly. See id. The law’s final version allowed
the use of PAS devices. See id.
108. See FLA. STAT. § 322.2615(1)(a) (Supp. 1996).
109. See supra text accompanying note 95.
110. See E. John Wherry, Jr., The Rush to Convict DWI Offenders: The Unintended
Unconstitutional Consequences, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 429, 446-47 (1994) (stating that
mouth alcohol causes inordinately high readings if it has not dissipated and thus officers
should not give an immediate breath test). Because preliminary devices are used on the
scene, there would not be any time for mouth alcohol to dissipate if the driver had con-
sumed alcohol within the last 20 minutes.
111. See id. at 446 n. 129 (stating that the test will multiply the breath-alcohol level it
measures by 2100).
112. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11D-8.007(2) (1996).
113. See id.
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the new statute, PAS readings are presumed accurate and are ad-
missible as evidence in both formal and informal review proceed-
ings.114
Third, the presumption of accuracy and reliability of PAS devices
is questionable. Although Florida has not addressed the admissibil-
ity of PAS devices, most states have determined that they do not
meet the reliability requirements for admissibility under Frye v.
United States.115 The fact that PAS devices are not generally admis-
sible in other states raises serious concerns about their general ac-
ceptance in the scientific community.116 Like Florida, California has
a zero-tolerance law for persons under twenty-one and uses PAS de-
vice readings as admissible evidence.117 A California court reviewing
a challenge under this zero-tolerance statute ruled that the state
muse lay a foundation for the reliability of these devices.118 The court
emphasized that “attacking the reliability of the PAS test may be the
licensee’s only real way of defending against a zero tolerance law
violation. To conclude that the DMV need not establish a foundation
for the admission of the PAS tests would severely hamper the licen-
see’s ability to defend.”119 Thus, California requires a showing that
the device was in proper working order and a qualified operator
properly administered the test.120
Balancing the individual’s right against erroneous deprivation
through the use of PAS devices requires returning to the issue of the
state’s interests in fiscal costs and public safety. The state appar-
ently does not have a strong fiscal reason for the admissibility of
readings from PAS devices.121 As previously stated, the issue of pub-
lic safety in relation to blood- or breath-alcohol levels as low as
0.02% would appear to carry little weight.122 With the strong possi-
bility of erroneous deprivation through the use and presumption of
accuracy of PAS devices, it seems that the individual’s procedural
                                                                                                                   
114. See FLA. STAT. § 322.2616(17) (Supp. 1996).
115. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Frye established the “generally accepted in the sci-
entific community” rule for determining admissibility. See id. at 1014; see also Wherry,
supra note 110, at 466. However, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509
U.S. 579 (1993), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Frye standard was superseded in
federal courts by the more flexible standard of whether the evidence is based on scientific
knowledge and will assist the jury in understanding or determining a fact in issue. See id.
at 587-92. Nonetheless, Florida continues to recognize Frye as the appropriate standard.
See Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. 1993).
116. See Flanagan, 625 So. 2d at 828.
117. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 23136 (West 1995).
118. See Coniglio v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 123, 132 (Ct. App.
1995).
119. Id. at 133.
120. See id.
121. It should not cost the state any more to use the machines that are already in use
and that are admissible under sections 322.2615 and 316.1932, Florida Statutes.
122. See supra text accompanying note 95.
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due process interest would outweigh any state interest.123 Hence, the
presumption of accuracy for PAS device readings would likely be a
violation of procedural due process.124 To remedy this problem, the
Legislature should either remove this provision altogether, amend it
to allow PAS devices to be used only as screening tools, or require
the state to lay a foundation for their reliability.
C.   Double Jeopardy
Both the U.S. Constitution and the Florida Constitution ensure
that an individual will not be put in jeopardy for an offense more
than once.125 The double jeopardy guarantee consists of three consti-
tutional protections: (1) the right not to be prosecuted for the same
crime following acquittal; (2) the right not to be prosecuted for the
same crime following a conviction; and (3) the right not to suffer
multiple punishments for the same offense.126 Civil penalties are not
exempt from a double jeopardy analysis and may constitute a viola-
tion.127
Many have argued unsuccessfully that an administrative suspen-
sion of a driver’s license and a criminal drinking and driving prose-
cution that arise out of the same incident constitute a double jeop-
ardy violation.128 While the issue is well settled, the new administra-
tive suspension statute raises constitutional issues not present in
previous cases.
Florida courts, in analyzing double jeopardy challenges to ad-
ministrative suspensions of driver’s licenses and criminal drinking
and driving prosecutions, have looked to the “primary purpose” of
the suspension statute.129 Penalties that are characterized as pri-
                                                                                                                   
123. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
124. See id.
125. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
126. See Lippman v. State, 633 So. 2d 1061, 1064 (Fla. 1994) (citing North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989) (“Simply put, a civil as
well as a criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as applied in the
individual case serves the goal of punishment.”).
128. See Smith v. Gainesville, 93 So. 2d 105, 106-07 (Fla. 1957) (holding the adminis-
trative suspension of driver’s license did not violate double jeopardy because the primary
goal of the statute was to protect the public and not to impose pain or punishment on the
offender); Davidson v. MacKinnon, 656 So. 2d 223, 223-25 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (finding no
double jeopardy violation); State v. Murray, 644 So. 2d 533, 533-35 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
(finding primary purpose of suspension was remedial and not punitive); Freeman v. State,
611 So. 2d 1260, 1261 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (finding suspension was for public protection
and not punishment).
129. See Smith, 93 So. 2d at 106-07 (stating that the statute’s “primary purpose is to
relieve the public generally of the sometimes death-dealing pain” caused by drunk driv-
ers); Davidson, 656 So. 2d at 225 (“[W]e conclude that the administrative remedy of sus-
pending a driver’s license . . . continues to be primarily for the purpose of enhancing safe
driving on the public highways.”); Murray, 644 So. 2d at 535 (“Because the primary pur-
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marily remedial in nature do not invoke double jeopardy.130 The
courts have broadly defined remedial civil penalties as those meant
to compensate the state for a loss or remove a danger from its citi-
zens.131 The crux of the double jeopardy argument is that the suspen-
sion is punitive because it constitutes retribution for, or seeks to de-
ter individuals from, driving under the influence of alcohol.132 The
courts in Florida, however, have always found that driver’s license
suspensions are remedial rather than punitive in nature.133 Courts
base this finding on the premise that drunk drivers are a lethal dan-
ger and the removal of such dangers enhances the safety of the pub-
lic highways.134
Under the new statute, it would be difficult for the courts to find a
primarily remedial purpose for the suspension. In cases where the
courts found no double jeopardy violation, the findings were based on
the fact that the suspension was for public protection.135 Again, how-
ever, the low levels of alcohol required for a suspension do not pri-
marily serve the purpose of creating safer highways.136 One is pre-
sumed legally sober with a blood- or breath-alcohol level of less than
0.05%.137 Before passage of the statute, persons under the age of
twenty-one could have their driver’s license suspended under section
322.2615, Florida Statutes, as could those over twenty-one.138 Despite
the new statute, persons under the age of twenty-one can still have
their driver’s license suspended under Section 322.2615.139 It should
be obvious that the primary purpose of the new statute is to deter
those under twenty-one from drinking and driving at all. While this
is a laudable goal, it is untenable to maintain that removal of the
driver’s licenses for persons with blood- or breath-alcohol levels of
0.02% serves the primary purpose of public protection.140 If the pri-
                                                                                                                   
pose of [the statute] is to provide an administrative remedy for public protection, and not
to punish the offender, a double jeopardy prohibition does not arise.”).
In United States v. Halper, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a defendant may not be
subjected to an additional civil sanction if the sanction “may not be fairly characterized as
remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.” 435 U.S. at 449. However, the Halper de-
cision used the term “remedial” in the sense of reimbursing the government for actual
costs attributable to the defendant’s conduct, not for actual public protection, as the term
is used by Florida courts in suspension of driver’s licenses cases. See id. at 449; Freeman
v. State, 611 So. 2d 1260, 1261 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (“A driver’s license suspension . . . is
not remedial in the sense meant by the Halper decision.”).
130. See, e.g., Davidson, 656 So. 2d at 223-25.
131. See, e.g., id.
132. See id. at 224.
133. See, e.g., id.
134. See id. at 225.
135. See, e.g., id.
136. See supra text accompanying note 95.
137. See FLA. STAT. § 316.1934(2)(a) (Supp. 1996).
138. See id. § 322.2615.
139. The suspension just cannot be dual. See id. § 322.2616(18).
140. See id. § 316.1934(2)(a).
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mary purpose were indeed public protection, it arguably should be
illegal for all drivers to have such blood- or breath-alcohol levels. 
Accordingly, the primary purpose of the statute is deterrence.
Therefore, if an individual’s driver’s license is suspended under sec-
tion 322.2616, Florida Statutes, and that individual is criminally
prosecuted for drinking and driving under section 316.193, a double
jeopardy issue arises. While the primary purpose of the statute as ap-
plied to a person with a blood- or breath-alcohol level of 0.05% or
higher is arguably remedial, and thus not a double jeopardy violation,
courts employing a double jeopardy analysis first look only at the stat-
ute, not how it is applied in an individual case.141 The Florida Legisla-
ture can remedy a potential problem by amending the new statute to
limit suspensions to blood- or breath-alcohol levels of 0.02 to 0.049%,
which would eliminate possible criminal drinking and driving charges.
D.   Public Policy
The administrative driver’s license suspension statute presents
two conflicting public policy concerns. The first concern is the pre-
vention of bodily harm and injury brought about by underage
drinking and driving. The second concern involves issues of fairness
and the protection of individual constitutional rights. In balancing
these two concerns, the statute gives greater weight to preventing
the harm that results from underage drinking and driving than to
issues of fairness and the protection of individual constitutional
rights. However, the harm the statute aims to prevent is marginal
and, therefore, it should not be allowed to promote an unfair public
policy and infringe on individual constitutional rights.
Intimately linked to the public policy debate over this statute is
the public policy debate over the national drinking age. At the height
of the Vietnam War, the drinking age was twenty-one.142 However,
fairness concerns caused society to evaluate this restriction because
tens of thousands of young men were dying in the war, yet were not
old enough to drink legally.143 Accordingly, many states lowered their
drinking age from twenty-one to either eighteen or nineteen.144
Based on similar concerns, the nation amended its Constitution—an
extremely rare event—to give those aged eighteen to twenty the
right to vote.145 In the 1980s, with the Vietnam War over and an in-
                                                                                                                   
141. See United States v. Brown, 917 F. Supp. 780, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (“[D]ouble
jeopardy analysis . . . requires that a court first inquire whether the statute’s civil sanctions
include sanctions which can be characterized as punishment.”). Following a determination
that a statute is punitive, courts generally proceed to look at the statute as applied. See id.
142. See Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 652.
143. See id. at 652-53.
144. See id.
145. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
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creased national awareness of the warlike carnage resulting from
drinking and driving, the pendulum swung back towards the public
policy concern of preventing bodily harm and injury brought about
by underage drinking and driving, and the drinking age was re-
turned to twenty-one.146
Nevertheless, with the enactment of the administrative suspen-
sion statute, the pendulum has swung too far. Society must not lose
sight of basic fairness and the protection of individual rights. First, if
the true concern of lawmakers and organizations like MADD is re-
ducing fatalities through tough zero-tolerance legislation, why only
target drivers under twenty-one? Although drinking-and-driving sta-
tistics for this age group are generally higher per capita than for
other age groups, some groups over the age of twenty have a higher
rate of fatal accidents per vehicle mile.147
A second issue—one that is applicable to those aged eighteen to
twenty—is whether it is appropriate to treat young adults differently
than other adults. How can a society whose cornerstone is freedom
tell young adult men that at eighteen they are old enough to be
drafted and sent off to die for their country, but are neither old
enough nor responsible enough to drink alcohol? Further, how can
this age group be told that at eighteen both men and women are old
enough and responsible enough to make the decision to freely serve
the military and put themselves in harm’s way, but are not old
enough to drink alcohol? Although the body counts in Grenada, Pan-
ama, Iraq, and Somalia were not as high as those in Vietnam, the
principles of fairness that brought about the lowering of the drinking
age and the voting age remain the same, even without fresh memo-
ries of Vietnam. It is hypocritical to behave paternalistically when it
comes to the individual freedom of consuming alcohol, yet subject
this group to possible death under the guise of protecting freedom.
The nation should return to a practice of fairness and concern for in-
dividual rights and lower the drinking age to reflect the level of re-
sponsibility expected of young adults. Alternatively, the nation
should raise the age of conscription and age for enlistment to paral-
lel society’s concern for protecting the young.
V.   CONCLUSION
As shown, Florida’s new administrative driver’s license suspen-
sion statute presents both potential constitutional problems and un-
derlying public policy concerns. The Legislature should amend or
                                                                                                                   
146. See discussion supra notes 14-17.
147. See Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 658 (citing statistics showing that 21-year-olds
have a fatal accident rate of 4.08 per one million miles compared to a rate of 3.38 for 20-
year-olds); see also Manuel v. State, 677 So. 2d 116, 128 (La. 1996).
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remove the provision of the statute allowing readings from PAS de-
vices as prima facie evidence of guilt or, at a minimum, require the
state to lay a foundation for the reliability of the device readings.
Additionally, the use of PAS devices as a screening tool is extremely
questionable, and thus the Legislature should reconsider their use.
Lastly, the statute should be amended to apply only to blood- or
breath-alcohol levels of 0.02 to 0.049% to avoid any potential double
jeopardy problems. All persons, whether over or under the age of
twenty-one, are still covered by section 322.2615, Florida Statutes,
for blood- or breath-alcohol levels of 0.05% or higher.
Society should strive to avoid fixing its problems by adding to the
law books. There are many nonlegal ways to make streets safer and
reduce drunk driving by the young, such as through education and
by setting an appropriate example. Sober-driver programs should be
encouraged because the underaged will continue to drink regardless
of the law. Prohibition did not stop adults from drinking alcohol in
the early 1900s, and it will not stop those under twenty-one from
drinking today or tomorrow.
Lastly, placing such restrictions on a group of young adults is
problematic and counterintuitive to our foundation of freedom. Our
nation should think hard about treating young adults differently and
possibly revisit the issue of the national drinking age or, in the al-
ternative, the age for conscription. In a perfectly safe world, there
would be no airplane accidents, no automobile accidents, and no acts
of terrorism. However, in obtaining a perfectly safe world, we would
sacrifice most of the freedoms and protections we hold dear. The
lives of all Americans are precious, and the goals of protecting them
from the evils of drunk driving should continue. However, our free-
doms and rights are precious as well, and we should be cautious
when treading on them in the name of safety.
